As recent studies show, the notions of program obfuscation and zero knowledge are intimately connected. In this work, we explore this connection further, and prove the following general result. If there exists differing input obfuscation (diO) for the class of all polynomial time Turing machines, then there exists a four message, fully concurrent zero-knowledge proof system for all languages in NP with negligible soundness error. This result is constructive: given diO, our reduction yields an explicit protocol along with an explicit simulator that is "straight line" and runs in strict polynomial time.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge and program obfuscation. Zero-knowledge proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] are the classical example of the simulation paradigm. They allow a prover to convince a verifier that a mathematical statement x ∈ L is true while giving no additional knowledge to the verifier. Prior to 2001, all known zero-knowledge simulators used the (cheating) verifier V * as a black-box to produce their output (called the simulated view). Barak [Bar01] demonstrated how to take advantage of verifier's program to build, more powerful, non-black-box simulation techniques. Constructing and analyzing non-black-box simulators is significantly more challenging task.
The reason why taking advantage of verifier's code is difficult is because of the intriguing possibility of program obfuscation. Roughly speaking, program obfuscation is a method to transform a computer program (say described as a Boolean circuit) into a form that is executable but otherwise completely "unintelligible." In its strongest form, an obfuscated program leaks no information about the program beyond its "functionality" or the "input-output behavior". Therefore, access to the obfuscated program is no better than having black box access to it. This property, as formalized by Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang [BGI + 01], is called the virtual black box (VBB) security. It was shown in [BGI + 01] that VBB-secure obfuscation is impossible in general. In the hindsight, this negative result is also the fundamental reason why non-black-box (NBB) simulation techniques prove to be more powerful than black box techniques.
Zero-knowledge, in particular non-black-box simulation, is intimately connected to program obfuscation. This connection has been explicitly studied in the works of Hada [Had00] , and Bitansky and Paneth [BP12b, BP12a, BP13a] , and alluded to in several other works, e.g., [HT99, Bar01] ). In this work, we explore this line of research further, particularly in light of recent breakthrough work on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [GGH + 13].
Indistinguishability obfuscation. Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters [GGH + 13] present a candidate construction for a weaker notion of obfuscation called indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI + 01]. Roughly speaking, iO guarantees that if two (same size) programs C 0 , C 1 are functionally equivalent, then their obfuscations are computationally indistinguishable. A closely related notion is that of differing input obfuscation (diO) [BGI + 01] which, roughly speaking, guarantees that the obfuscations of C 0 and C 1 are computationally indistinguishable provided that it is hard to find an input x such that C 0 (x) = C 1 (x).
Garg et. al.
[GGH + 13] present a candidate construction of iO for the class of all polynomial size circuits. Candidate constructions of diO for the class of all polynomial time Turing machines were recently constructed by Ananth et. al. [ABG + 13], and Boyle, Chung, and Pass [BCP14] .
Our results. In this work we show how to use program obfuscation to build a new non-black-box simulation strategy that works for fully concurrent zero-knowledge. More specifically, we show that:
• If differing-input obfuscation (diO) exists for the class of all polynomial time Turing machines, then there exists a constant round, fully concurrent zero knowledge protocol for NP with negligible soundness error. The protocol has an explicit simulator; 1 the simulator is "straight line" and runs in strict polynomial time.
• We also show how to implement the core ideas of the above protocol in only four rounds. That is, our new protocol requires sending only four messages between the prover and the verifier.
Our protocol can be instantiated using the diO construction of Ananth et. al. [ABG + 13] which obfuscates polynomial time Turing machines that can accept inputs of variable length (at most polynomial in the security parameter). 2 We stress that we are able to obtain an explicit simulator for our protocol irrespective of the computational assumptions underlying the above mentioned diO. This is because we use the security-i.e., indistinguishability property-of obfuscation only in proving the soundness of our protocol. The simulator only depends on the correctness or the functionality of the obfuscated program, and hence can be described explicitly. As is usually the case with most cryptographic applications of obfuscation, we also require that obfuscation is "secure" w.r.t. auxiliary information. In our case the auxiliary information will consist of the transcripts of Barak's preamble (see theorems 5.1 and 6.1 for a precise statement).
Other than (auxiliary input) diO, our reduction only assumes standard (polynomial time hardness) assumptions, namely injective one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions. Interestingly, our reduction does not explicitly depend on CS-proofs/universal-arguments [Kil92, Mic94, Kil95, BG02] ; in particular, if we instantiate the construction of [ABG + 13] using the "SNARKs" of Bitansky et al. [BCCT13] (which does not rely on the PCP theorem), we obtain an instantiation of our protocol that also does not rely on the PCP theorem. 1 In some protocols, specifically those based on knowledge-type assumptions [HT99] , by virtue of the assumption that there exists an "extractor," we only obtain an existential result that a simulator exists; however, the actual program of the simulator is not explicitly given in the security proofs.
2 See Section 3.2 for the cryptographic assumptions underlying the candidate construction of [ABG + 13].
The round complexity of our final protocol also sheds new light on the exact (as opposed to asymptotic) round-complexity of concurrent zero-knowledge. Even in the simpler case of stand alone zero knowledge, the best known constructions require at least four rounds [FS89] , and historically, concurrent zeroknowledge has always required more rounds than stand alone zero-knowledge. 3 Our four round protocol, for the first time, closes the gap between the best known upper bounds on round complexities of concurrent versus standalone zero-knowledge protocols (whose simulators can be explicitly described).
In retrospect, the fact that obfuscation actually helps non-black-box simulation can be perplexing. Indeed, in all prior works along this line [Had00, BP12b, BP13a] , the core ideas for simulation are of opposite nature: it is the inability to obfuscate the "unobfuscatable functions" that helps the simulator. In our case, similar to [BP12a] , it is the ability to obfuscate programs that allows polynomial time simulation.
Technical Overview: Non-black-box Simulation via Program Obfuscation
Let us start by considering the simplest approach to zero-knowledge from (the possibility of) program obfuscation. For now, let us restrict ourselves to the case of stand alone zero-knowledge for NP-languages. Let x ∈ L be the statement and R be the witness-relation.
One simple approach is to have the verifier send an obfuscation of the following program M x,s which contains a secret string s ∈ {0, 1} n : M x,s (a) = s if and only R(x, a) = 1 and M x,s (a) = 0 n otherwise. Let M x,s denote the iO-secure obfuscation of M x,s . The real prover can recover s by using a witness w to x. Further, if x is false, M x,s is identical to M x,0 n and therefore must hide s, ensuring the soundness. 4 This gives us a two-message, honest verifier ZK proof. However, this idea does not help the simulation against malicious verifiers.
To fix this, let us try to use Barak's preamble (called GenStat [Bar01] ) which has the following three rounds: first, the verifier sends a collision-resistant hash function h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , then the prover sends a commitment c to 0 n (using a perfectly binding scheme Com), and then the verifier sends a string r ∈ {0, 1} n . The transcript defines a "fake statement" λ = h, c, r . A "fake witness" ω for the statement λ consists of a pair (Π, u) such that c = Com(h(Π) ; u) and Π is a program of length poly(n) which outputs the string r on input the string c (say, in n log log n steps). If h is a good collision-resistant hash function, then it was shown in [Bar01, BG02] , no efficient prover P * can output a satisfying witness ω to the statement λ (sampled in an interaction with the honest verifier). However, a simulator can commit to h(V * ) (instead of 0 n ) so that it will have a valid witness to the resulting transcript λ.
Coming back to our protocol, we use this idea as follows. We modify our first idea, and require the verifier to send a the obfuscation of a new program M λ,s (instead of M x,s ) where λ = h, c, r is the transcript of GenStat. The new program M λ,s outputs s if and only if it receives a valid witness ω to the statement λ (as described earlier) and 0 n on all other inputs. To prove the statement x will be proven by proving the knowledge of either a witness w to x or the secret s (using an ordinary witness-indistinguishable proofof-knowledge (WIPOK)). A simulator can "succeed" in the simulation as before: it commits to verifier's program in c to obtain (an indistinguishable statement) λ, then uses the fake witness ω (which it now has) to execute the program M λ,s (ω) and learn s and complete the WIPOK using s.
We now draw attention to some important points arising due to the use of λ in the obfuscation (instead of x). First, the length of the fake witness ω that the simulator has depends on the length of the program of V * . Since the protocol needs to take into account V * of every polynomial length, the obfuscated program M λ,s must accept inputs ω of arbitrary, a-priori unknown, polynomial length. In other words, the obfuscated program M λ,s must be a Turing machine which accepts inputs of arbitrary, a-priori unknown, (polynomial) length. Therefore, we will have to use program obfuscation for Turing machines.
Second, the statement λ = h, c, r is not a "false" statement since an all powerful prover can always find collisions in h and obtain a satisfying input to M λ,s . The only guarantee we have is that if λ is sampled as above, then it would be hard for any efficient prover-even those with a valid witness to x-to find a satisfying input for M λ,s . Therefore, unlike before (when x was used instead of λ), obfuscations M λ,s and M λ,0 n are not guaranteed to be indistinguishable if we use an iO-secure obfuscation; this is because the Turing machines M λ,s and M λ,0 n are not functionally equivalent. Therefore, we will have to use diO-secure obfuscation (since finding a differing input is still hard for these programs). As a matter of fact, we will need to assume auxiliary input diO as discussed later.
By putting these ideas together, we actually a get a standalone ZK protocol for NP (summarized below). The protocol needs to use some kind of reference to s other than the obfuscated program. This is done by using a f (s) where f is a one-way function. This protocol has a "straight line" simulator. Further, unlike Barak's protocol, this protocol does not use universal arguments (and hence the PCP theorem).
Standalone Zero-Knowledge using Obfuscation. The protocol has three stages.
1. Stage-1 is the 3 round preamble GenStat: V sends a CRHF h, P sends a commitment c = Com(0 n ; u) and V sends a random r ← {0, 1} n .
2. In stage 2, V sends (f, s, M λ,s ) where f is a one-way function, s = f (s), and M λ,s is the obfuscation of Turing machine M λ,s described earlier and λ = h, c, r is the transcript of stage-1. V also proves that (f, s, M λ,s ) are correctly constructed (using a standard ZK proof).
3. In stage-3 P provess, using a standard WIPOK, the knowledge of "either a witness w to x or secret s such that s = f (s)."
Standalone ZK of this protocol can be proven by following Barak's simulator which commits to the code of V * and therefore has an ω for simulated statement λ such that M λ,s (ω) = s within a polynomial number of steps; the simulator computes s and uses it in the WIPOK. The soundness of the protocol relies on the diO-security of obfuscation. Indeed, following [Bar01] , for a properly sampled λ, it is hard to find ω such that M λ,s (ω) = M λ,0 n (ω), and therefore it is hard to distinguish M λ,s from M λ,0 n by diO-security of obfuscation. Now, soundness is argued using three hybrid experiments: first use the simulator of the ZK protocol in stage 2, then replace M λ,s from M λ,0 n , and finally extract s from the WIPOK in stage 3 and violate the hardness of one-way function f (since x is false, extraction must yield s).
The issue of auxiliary information. An important point we wish to highlight here is that of auxiliary input. A cheating prover P * in the protocol above, will have access to the statements λ in addition to the obfuscated program M λ,s . Therefore, λ is the auxiliary information that the receiver of the obfuscated program already has! Therefore, we must require the obfuscation to satisfy the (stronger) notion of auxiliary input diO [ABG + 13, BCP14] w.r.t. the transcripts of GenStat (i.e., Barak's preamble).
Towards Constant Round Concurrent Zero-knowledge
The simplest way to see why the protocol of previous section does not work in the concurrent setting is to consider its execution in a recursively interleaved schedule (described by Dwork, Naor, and Sahai [DNS98] ).
In the context of our protocol, this schedule will have n sessions interleaved recursively as follows: session n does not "contain" any messages of any other session, and all messages of session i are contained between messages c i−1 and r i−1 of session i − 1 for every i , starting from i = n. For completeness, this scheduling is shown in figure 1 (towards the end of the paper) with respect to 3 sessions. The double-headed arrows marked by π i represent the rest of the messages of the i-th session. Roughly speaking, the simulation fails because of the following: in order to simulate session i, the simulator needs to extract the secret s i by running the program M λ i ,s i ; however, the execution of M λ i ,s i contains an execution of M λ i+1 ,s i+1 and due to this recursion, simulator's total running time in session 1 is exponential in n.
More formally, consider the scheduling given in figure 1. Let t 3 ≥ 1 be the time taken by the verifier in computing r 3 on input the string c 3 . Then clearly, the time taken by the simulator in running the obfuscated machine M λ 3 ,s 3 is T 3 ≥ t 3 . Then, if t 2 denotes the time taken by the simulator to obtain string r 2 , we have that t 2 ≥ t 3 + T 3 ≥ 2t 3 . Clearly, the time taken by the simulator to extract s 2 by running the program M λ 2 ,s 2 will be at least T 2 ≥ t 2 ≥ 2t 3 . By repeating this argument for session 1, we have that
Repeating this argument for n sessions in the DNS schedule, the total time taken by the simulator will be ≥ 2 n−1 .
π 1 -
Figure 1: DNS scheduling for our protocol
Avoiding recursive computation via DGS-oracle. It is clear that the reason our stand-alone simulator runs in exponential time is because in order to compute s i for session i, the simulator runs (the obfuscation of) a program which recursively runs such a program for every interleaved session between c i and r i . That is, the program M λ i ,s i ends up recomputing all of the secrets of the interleaved sessions even though they have already been computed. We can avoid this recomputation as follows. Let I be an oracle which takes as input queries of the form (f, s)-where f is an injective one-way function and s is in the range of f -and returns the unique value s such that f (s) = s. 5 Now consider an arbitrary program Π I which has access to the inversion oracle I. Clearly, if r is chosen randomly, then for any (fixed) program Π I and any fixed input a, the probability that Π I (a) = r is at most 2 −n . This is because once the description of the oracle program Π · is fixed, the output of Π I (a) is deterministically fixed (for any fixed input a chosen prior to seeing r) and r hits this value with probability at most 2 −n .
Our main point here is that it is hard to come up with a satisfying "fake witness" ω to the transcripts λ = h, c, r even if the program committed in c is given access to the inversion oracle I. On the other hand, the simulator can still predict r as before. However, more importantly, by means of the oracle I we can avoid the recursive re-computation of the secrets in the concurrent setting as follows.
Consider an alternative simulator S · which will be given access to the oracle I. This simulator will have access to both, the program of the verifier V * as well as its own program, given as explicit inputs, collectively denoted as Π · S,V * . The simulator, on input a session index i, will work by initiating an execution of V * . It will commit to program Π · S,V * (j) in session j (ignoring for the moment the fact that simulator needs fresh randomness); finally, this simulator does not run any obfuscated program to compute the secrets. Instead it queries the oracle I on "well formed" (f j , s j ) for every session j = i; when j = i it simply returns the string r i . Then, if all goes well, observe that program Π · (i) predicts string r i in polynomial time (given I) and this holds for every session i. In particular, there is no recursive recomputation of the secrets since they can be fed to the program directly once they have been computed. We note that such an oracle was first used by Deng, Goyal, and Sahai [DGS09] to construct the first resettably-sound resettable zero-knowlege protocol for NP.
It should be clear that the actual simulation will be performed by a "main" simulator S main which will not have access to any inversion oracle, and run in (strict) polynomial time. The main simulator will run in the same manner as the alternative simulator S · except that instead of using I, it will run the obfuscated programs (only once for each session) to recover the secrets. To ensure efficient simulation, once a session secret has been recovered, it will be stored in a global table T (which will be used to simulate answers of I). Therefore the "fake witness" will now have the form ω = u, Π · , T ), but the statements will still have the same form λ = h, c, r ; and we require that Π T outputs r within finite steps. These requirements will be formally captured by defining a relation R sim w.r.t. the preamble GenStat in Section 4. We will discuss the overview of four round construction in Section 6.
Related Work
Concurrent zero-knowledge and non-black-box simulation. From early on, it was understood and explicitly proven in [FS90, GK96] , that zero-knowledge is not preserved under parallel repetition where multiple sessions of the protocol run at the same time. The more complex notion of concurrent zero-knowledge (cZK) was introduced and achieved by Dwork, Naor, and Sahai [DNS98] (assuming "timing constraints" on the underlying network). A large body of research on cZK studied the round-complexity of black-box concurrent ZK with improving lower bounds on the same [KPR98, Ros00, CKPR03] . The state of art is the lower-bound is by Canetti, Kilian, Petrank, and Rosen [CKPR03] who prove that black-box cZK requires at least O (log n/ log log n) rounds where n is the length of the statements being proven. Prabhakaran, Rosen, and Sahai [PRS02] , building upon the prior works of Richardson and Kilian [RK99] and Kilian and Petrank [KP01] , presented a cZK protocol for NP which has O(log n) rounds, matching the lower bound of [CKPR03] .
The central open question in this area is to construct a constant round cZK protocol for NP languages based on standard (or at least reasonable) assumptions. Barak [Bar01] showed that in the bounded concurrent setting where there is an a-priori upper bound on the number of sessions, there exists a constant round non-black-box cZK protocol for NP; the protocol is based on the existence of collision-resistant hash functions [Bar01] and uses universal arguments [Kil92, Mic94, Kil95, BG02] . The communication complexity of Barak's protocol depends on the a-priori bound on the sessions.
It has proven difficult to extend Barak's NBB techniques to the setting of fully concurrent ZK (i.e., to unbounded polynomially many sessions) in o(log n) rounds. Nevertheless, NBB techniques have enjoyed great success resulting in the construction of resettable protocols [BGGL01, DL07, DGS09, GM11], nonmalleable protocols [Bar02, PR05b, PR05a] , leakage-resilient ZK [Pan14] , bounded-concurrent secure computation [PR03, Pas04] , adaptive security [GS12a] , and so on. Bitanksy and Paneth [BP12a] showed that it is possible to perform non-black-box simulation using oblivious transfer (instead of collision-resistant hash functions and universal arguments). This eventually led to the construction of resettablly-sound ZK under one-way functions [BP13a, CPS13, COPV13] . Goyal [Goy13] presents a non-black-box simulation technique in the fully concurrent setting and achieves the first public-coin cZK protocol in the plain model. 6 An alternative approach to construct round-efficient zero-knowledge proofs is to use "knowledge assumptions" [Dam91, HT99, BP04] . The recent work of Gupta and Sahai [GS12b] shows that such assumptions also yield a constant round concurrent ZK protocol for NP. However, all known ZK protocols based on knowledge-type assumptions do not yield an explicit simulator. This is because the knowledge-type assumptions assume the existence of a special "extractor" machine (which is not explicitly known); this extractor is used by the simulator of ZK protocols and only provides an "existential" result.
Chung, Lin, and Pass [CLP13b] recently presented the first construction of a constant-round fully concurrent ZK protocol which has an explicit simulator. Their result is based on a new complexity-theoretic assumption, namely the existence of so called "strong P-certificates."
Another alternative proposed in the literature is to assume some kind of a setup such as timing constraints, (untrusted) public-key infrastructure, and so on [DNS98, DS98, CGGM00, Dam00, Gol02, PTV10, GJO + 13] or switch to super-polynomial time simulation [Pas03, PV08] . We will not consider such models further in this work. [BCP14] introduces a related notion of extractability obfuscation and shows conditions under which this notion (and diO) are implied by iO. In addition, it also presents obfuscation for the class of polynomial time Turing machines, building upon the work of Brakerski and Rothblum [BR13a] .
The issue of auxiliary information in program obfuscation was first considered by Goldwasser and Kalai [GK05] , and further explored in [GK13, BCPR13, BP13b] . The work of Bitansky, Canetti, Paneth, and Rosen [BCPR13] shows that if iO exists then "extractability primitives" such as knowledge-types assumptions and extractable one-way functions [CD09] cannot exist in the presence of arbitrary auxiliary information. Boyle and Pass [BP13b] strengthen this result further by showing a pair of (universal) distributions Z,Z' on auxiliary information such that either extractable OWF w.r.t. Z do not exist or extractabilityobfuscations w.r.t. Z' do not exist.
Preliminaries
We use standard notations which are recalled here. This section can be skipped without affecting readability.
Notation. For a randomized algorithm A we write A(x; r) the process of evaluating A on input x with random coins r. We write A(x) the process of sampling a uniform r and then evaluating A(x; r). We define A(x, y; r) and A(x, y) analogously. We denote by N and R the set of natural and real numbers respectively. The concatenation of two string a and b is denoted by a b.
We assume familiarity with interactive Turing machines (ITMs). For two randomized ITMs A and B, we denote by [A(x, y) ↔ B(x, z)] the interactive computation between A and B, with A's inputs (x, y) and B's inputs (x, z), and uniform randomness; and [A(x, y; r A ) ↔ B(x, z; r B )] when we wish to specify randomness. We denote by VIEW P [A(x, y) ↔ B(x, z)] and OUT P [A(x, y) ↔ B(x, z)] the view and output of machine P ∈ {A, B} in this computation. Finally, TRANS[A(x, y) ↔ B(x, z)] denotes the transcript of the interaction [A(x, y) ↔ B(x, z)] which consists of all messages exchanged in the computation.
We also assume familiarity with oracle Turing machines, which are ordinary TMs with an extra tape called the oracle communication tape. An oracle TMs A will be written as A · to insist that it is an oracle TM; in addition, we write A I when A's oracle is fixed to I. Recall that each query to I counts as one step towards the running time of A I .
Unless specified otherwise, all algorithms receive a parameter n ∈ N, called the security parameter, as their first input. Often, the security parameter will not be mentioned explicitly and dropped from the notation. With some exceptions, all algorithms run in poly(n) steps and all inputs have poly(n) length. A function negl : N → R is negligible if it approaches zero faster than every polynomial.
Two ensembles {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are said to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted {X n } c ≈ {Y n }, if for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguishers D, sufficiently large n, and every advice string z n :
, where we write D n (a) to denoted D(n, z n , a), and negl is a negligible function. The statistical distance between two probability distributions X and Y over the same support S is denoted by
We say that ensembles {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are statistically indistinguishable (or statistically close), denoted {X n } s ≈ {Y n }, if there exists a negligible function negl such that ∆ (X n , Y n ) ≤ negl(n) for all sufficiently large n.
Standard primitives. In this work, we will be using a family of injective one-way functions. In addition, unless specified otherwise, we assume that all functions f ∈ F n in the family have an efficiently testable range membership: i.e., there exists a polynomial time algorithm to test that y ∈ Range(f ) where Range(f ) denotes the range of f .
We will also be using a family of collision resistant hash functions (CRHF) {H n } where h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} poly(n) for h ∈ H n ; recall that {H n } is a CRHF family if there exists a negligible function negl such that for every non-uniform PPT machines A, every sufficiently large n, and every advice string z n :
Finally, we will also be using a non-interactive, perfectly binding commitment scheme for committing strings of polynomial length. A commitment to a string m using randomness u will be denoted by c = Com(m; u). Without loss of generality, we assume that the message m committed to in c can be recovered given the randomness u and the string c. We assume perfectly binding schemes purely for the simplicity of exposition. One can replace Com by the 2-round statistically-binding commitment scheme of Naor [Nao89] without affecting our results.
Interactive Proofs, Proofs of Knowledge, and Witness Indistinguishability
We recall the standard definitions of interactive proofs [GMR85] , witness indistinguishability [FS90] , and proofs of knowledge [GMR85, TW87, FFS88, FS90, BG92, PR05b]. Definition 2.1 (Interactive Proofs). A pair of probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines P, V is called an interactive argument system for a language L ∈ NP with witness relation R if there exists a negligible function negl : N → R such that the following two conditions hold:
• Completeness: for every x ∈ L, and every witness w such that R(x, w) = 1, it holds that
• Soundness: for every x / ∈ L, every interactive Turing machine P * running in time at most poly(|x|), and every y ∈ {0, 1} * ,
If the soundness condition holds for every (not necessarily PPT) machine P * then P, V is called an interactive proof system.
The probability in the soundness condition is called the soundness error of the system, and we say that the system has negligible soundness error since this probability is at most negl(|x|). Although, traditionally soundness error is defined in terms of the statement length |x|, in cryptographic contexts, it is convenient to define it in terms of the security parameter n, and write negl(n). This is without loss of generality, since in our setting since |x| = poly(n). Also, in this work, we will use words "argument" and "proof" interchangeably throughout the paper. Definition 2.2 (Proof of Knowledge). Let P, V be an interactive proof system for a language L ∈ NP with witness relation R. We say that P, V is a proof of knowledge (POK) for relation R if there exists a polynomial p and a probabilistic oracle machine E (called the extractor) such that for every PPT ITM P * , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every x ∈ L, and every (y, r) ∈ {0, 1} * such that q x,y,r := Pr[OUT V [P * x,y,r ↔ V (x)] = 1] > 0 where P * x,y,r denotes the machine P * whose common input, auxiliary input, and randomness are fixed to x, y and r respectively and the probability is taken over the randomness of V , the following conditions holds:
• the expected number of steps taken by E P * x,y,r is bounded by p(|x|) qx,y,r , where E P * x,y,r is machine E with oracle access to P * x,y,r ;
• except with negligible probability, E P *
x,y,r outputs w * such that R(x, w * ) = 1.
Definition 2.3 (Witness Indistinguishable Proofs)
. Let P, V be an interactive proof system for a language L ∈ NP with witness relation R. We say that P, V is witness indistinguishable (WI) for relation R if for every PPT ITM V * , every statement x ∈ L, every pair of witnesses (w 1 , w 2 ) such that R(x, w i ) = 1 for every i ∈ {1, 2}, and every (advice) string z ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that {VIEW
As before, w.l.o.g., we can replace |x| by the security parameter n in all definitions above. We remark that there exists a WIPOK with strict polynomial time extraction in constant rounds using non-black-box techniques [BL04] and in ω(1) rounds using black-box techniques [GMR85, Blu87] .
Three round, public-coin WIPOKand ZAPs. The classical protocols of [GMR85, Blu87] , based on the existence of non-interactive perfectly binding commitment schemes, are 3-round witness indistinguishable, proof of knowledge (WIPOK) protocols (for every language in NP). We will use Blum's protocol [Blu87] as a building block and denote its three messages by α, β, γ , where β is random string of sufficient length. 7 A ZAP for a language L, introduced by Dwork and Naor [DN00] , is a two round witness indistinguishable interactive proof for L. ZAPs can be constructed from a variety of assumptions such as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [BFM88, BSMP91] (which in turn can be based on trapdoor permutations [FLS99] ) and verifiable random functions [MRV99] . In fact, even non-interarctive (i.e., one round) constructions for ZAPs for all of NP exist based on bilinear pairings [GOS06] and derandomization techniques [BOV03] .
We will use the two round construction of [DN00] based on NIZK as a building block and denote its two messages by σ, π where σ is a randomly string of sufficient length. An important property of this construction is adaptive soundness: the statement to be proven can be chosen after the string σ has been sent by the verifier. We will rely on this property in our security proofs. 7 We remark that this protocol has a black-box extractor whose expected running time is proportional to the inverse of a cheating prover's success probability. However, there also exist WIPOK with strict polynomial time extraction in constant rounds using non-black-box techniques [BL04] and in ω(1) rounds using black-box techniques [GMR85, Blu87] .
Concurrent Zero Knowledge
We now recall the notion of concurrent zero-knowledge [DNS98] in which one considers a "concurrent adversary" V * who interacts in many copies of P , proving adaptively chosen, possibly correlated, polynomially many statements. We follow conventions established in [DNS98, PRS02, Ros04] .
Concurrent attack. The concurrent attack on an interactive proof systems P, V for language L ∈ NP with witness relation R considers an arbitrary interactive TM V * which opens at most m = m(n) sessions for an arbitrary polynomial m with arbitrary auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * . Let x := {x i } ∈ L m be set of statements in L of length at most poly(n), and w := {w i } i∈ [m] be such that R(x i , w i ) = 1. The attack proceeds by uniformly fixing the random coins of V * and initiating its execution on input the security parameter n ∈ N and auxiliary input z. At each step, V * either initiates a new session-in which case a new prover instance P (x i , w i ) with fresh randomness is fixed who interacts with V * in session i; or V * schedules the delivery of a message of an existing session in which the corresponding prover instance responds with corresponding message. There is no restriction on how V * schedules the messages of various sessions. We say that V * launches m-concurrent attack on P, V . The output of the attack consists of the view of V * , denoted VIEW
Definition 2.4 (Concurrent Zero Knowledge). We say that an interactive proof system P, V for a language L ∈ NP (with witness relation R) is concurrent zero knowledge if for every polynomial m : N → N, every PPT ITM V * launching a m-concurrent attack, there exists a PPT machine S V * such that for every set x := {x i } ∈ L m of statements of length at most poly(n), every w := {w i } i∈ [m] such that R(x i , w i ) = 1, and every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that
In what follows, we will sometimes abuse the notation and write V * to also mean the description of the Turing machine V * . However, when we want to be explicit about the description of a Turing machine M (including V * ), we will actually write desc(M ). For the simulator, we may sometimes write S V * (·) := S(V * , ·) to insist that the program of V * is given as an explicit input to the simulator (and drop n from the notation). Further, we will assume a (unique) session identifier for each session represented by a string of length n; this session identifier can be chosen by V * so long as it is unique for every session. W.l.o.g. we assume that the all-ones string 1 n (not to be confused with the unary representation of the security parameter) is never used as a session identifier and denotes a special symbol.
Differing Input Obfuscation for Turing Machines
In this section, we recall the notion of differing input obfuscation (diO) for Turing machines. A weaker somewhat variant of this definition, namely extractability obfuscation (eO) was defined and explored in [BCP14] . As mentioned earlier, we will actually need to work with what is called distributional auxiliary infomration diO (or eO) where the auxiliary information will be sampled according a hard distribution, say Z, over the statements of L a sim for an arbitrary polynomial a. Recall that L a sim is the language corresponding to relation R a sim which are decidable in time at most poly(α(n)).
Definitions
Let Steps(M, x) denote the number of steps taken by a TM M on input x; we use the convention that if M does not halt on x then Steps(M, x) is defined to be the special symbol ∞. We define the notion of "compatible Turing machines" and "nice sampler." A pair of TMs (M 0 , M 1 ) is said to be compatible if they have the same size, and more crucially, for every input x if M 0 halts on x then M 1 also halts on x in the same number of steps. I.e., for every x, Steps(M 0 , x) = Steps(M 1 , x). We then consider sampling algorithms Samp which output a pair of compatible TMs (M 0 , M 1 ), and say that Samp is "nice" if no PPT adversary A can produce an x such that: M 0 (x) = M 1 (x) and both M 0 , M 1 halt within a polynomial number of steps on input x. This requirement, or some variant of it, is necessary [ABG + 13, BCP14].
Definition 3.1 (Compatible TMs). A pair of Turing machines (M 0 , M 1 ) is said to be compatible if |M 0 | = |M 1 | and for every string x ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that Steps(M 0 , x) = Steps(M 1 , x).
By our convention, the second condition implies that M 0 halts on x if and only if M 1 halts on x.
Definition 3.2 (Nice TM Sampler). We say that a (possibly non-uniform) PPT Turing machine Samp is a nice sampler for Turing machines if the following conditions hold:
is always a pair of compatible TMs, and z ∈ {0, 1} * is a string;
2. there exists a negligible function negl such that for every polynomial a : N → N, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and every (possibly non-uniform) TM A running in time at most a(n), it holds that:
Some remarks are in order. First, note that since M 0 , M 1 are always compatible and Steps(M 0 , x) ≤ a(n), we have that Steps(M 1 , x) ≤ a(n). Further, the "event" in the parentheses above can actually be tested in polynomial time. This is because every step defining this event can be performed in polynomial time. Finally, note that since the definition quantifies over all polynomials a, it allows A to produce any input x so long as M 0 , M 1 halts on x within a polynomial number of steps.
The first output of Samp above will be used as auxiliary information in the definition below. We will denote the distribution of first output of Samp by Z.
Differing input obfuscator. We now present the definition of a Z-auxiliary differing input obfuscator for Turing machines. Roughly speaking, the notion states that a machine O is a Z-auxiliary diO for (possibly non-uniform) efficiently samplable Z = {Z n } if the following holds: if there exists a PPT distinguisher D who distinguishes O(M 0 ) from O(M 1 ) when given auxiliary input z ← Z n , then it is easy to find an x (given z) such that M 0 (x) = M 1 (x). In other words, if it is hard to find the "differing input" x then the two obfuscations are indistinguishable.
We now present the definition below, following [ABG + 13]. We note that since we want to be explicit about the distribution of the auxiliary information (the first output of the sampling algorithm Samp), we will denote it by Z. 1. Polynomial slowdown and functionality: there exists a polynomial a dio such that for every n ∈ N, every M ∈ M n , every input x such that M halts on x, and every M ← O(n, M ), the following conditions hold:
Polynomial a dio is called the slowdown polynomial of O.
2. Indistinguishability: for every nice sampler Samp (i.e., satisfying definition 3.2) whose first output is distributed according to Z, there exists a negligible function negl such that for every polynomial a : N → N, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and every (possibly non-uniform) TM D running in time at most a(n), it holds that:
Machine D is called the distinguisher.
Candidate Constructions
As noted earlier, our reduction requires the existence of Z-auxiliary diO for the class of all polynomial size Turing machines which accept inputs of arbitrary polynomial length (in n) and halt within polynomial steps with respect to all (possibly nonuniform) efficiently samplable distributions Z that are hard over the statements of L a sim for every polynomial a. A candidate construction for this primitive appears in the work of [ABG + 13]. Their construction is based on diO of the class of all polynomial-size circuits (constructed in [GGH + 13]), fully homomorphic encryption (e.g., [Gen09, BV11] , and SNARKs [BCCT13] (which require knowledge-type assumptions). If an a-priori bound on the input is known, then comparatively better constructions are possible [ABG + 13, BCP14].
Our requirements from obfuscation are actually weaker than stated above. We do not need obfuscation for the class of all (polynomial size and running time) Turing machines; instead we only require the obfuscation of the machine SimLock which (receive inputs of arbitrary, a-priori unknown, polynomial length and) halt within a polynomial number of steps. We also do not need security w.r.t. every hard distribution Z over L a sim ; instead, we only need to assume that it holds for the statements λ that are transcripts of the GenStat protocol (with an arbitrary cheating prover P * 1 ). Interestingly, this kind of advice can be simulated using the distribution Z * that simply outputs (h, r); therefore distribution Z can actually be uniform distribution if h is a "public-coin" CRHF [HR04] making it a more plausible assumption.
As we have to come to learn [GK05, GK13, BCPR13, BP13b], security w.r.t. arbitrary auxiliary inputs might be too strong an assumption. Bitansky, Canetti, Paneth, and Rosen [BCPR13] show that either indistinguishability obfuscation does not exist for all circuits or for every OWF-family F there exists an auxiliary input distribution Z F w.r.t. which F is not an extractable OWF family [CD09] . Boyle and Pass [BP13b] further strengthen this result by showing a pair of distributions Z,Z' such that either extractable OWFs do not exist w.r.t. Z or diO for (the class of all PPT) Turing machines does not exist w.r.t. Z'. Thus at least one of these assumptions must fall. However, as they further note, it does not invalidate assumptions for other distributions Z (in particular when Z can be uniform). These negative results also do not necessarily contradict the conjectured security of candidate construction of [ABG + 13] w.r.t. the auxiliary input distributions we need (namely transcripts of GenStat or Z * mentioned above). Nevertheless, we hope that candidate constructions based on better complexity-theoretic assumptions will be discovered for this primitive in the future.
Relation R sim and A Nice Sampler
In this section, we define the preamble GenStat, relations R sim , R a sim , and prove that a randomly sampled transcript of GenStat is a hard distribution over the statements of language L sim (corresponding to relation R sim ). For convenience, we use a non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme; the two-round statistically-binding commitment scheme of [Nao89] also works.
Preamble GenStat
Statement generation protocol. Let {H n } be a family of collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF) h ∈ H n such that h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n and Com be a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme for {0, 1} n . The statement generation protocol GenStat := P 1 , V 1 is a three round protocol between P 1 and V 1 which proceeds as follows:
1. V 1 sends a random h ← H n 2. P 1 sends a commitment c = Com(0 n ; u) where u is a randomly chosen 3. V 1 sends a random string r ← {0, 1} n The transcript of the protocol is λ := h, c, r .
Relation R sim
We now define the relation R sim . Let {F n } n∈N and {H n } n∈N denote the family of injective one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions respectively. Let Com be a non-interactive, perfectly binding (string) commitment scheme. The relation is formally defined in figure 2. The statements for the relation R sim are the transcripts λ := (h, c, r) and the witnesses are of the form ω := (u, Π · , T ) such that c is a commitment to the oracle-TM Π · using randomness u, T is a table containing answers to all inversion queries that Π · makes (for functions f ∈ F n ), and Π T outputs r. 8 An important observation regrading R sim is that since table T is not a part of the commitment c (and it should not be), we must enforce that Π · never makes any invalid queries to T . This is because after seeing r, it is easy to design a "bad" table T which will encode r by means of "bad" entries and "satisy" λ.
Relation R sim is undecidable in general. For convenience, we define a decidable, polynomial time, version of R sim , denoted by R a sim where a : N → N is a polynomial, as follows.
Relation R a sim and language L a sim : Let a : N → N be a polynomial; relation R a sim is identical to R sim except that the witness (u, Π · , T ) satisfies following additional constraints:
Instance: A tuple h, c, r ∈ H n × {0, 1} poly(n) × {0, 1} n where h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n .
Witness: A tuple u, Π · , T ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * where Π · is an oracle Turing machine, and T is a table containing entries of the form (f, s, s) such that when queried on (f, s), T returns s, denoted T (f, s) = s.
Relation:
Figure 2: Relation R sim based on a perfectly binding commitment Com.
Let L sim (resp. L a sim ) be the language corresponding to relation R sim (resp., R a sim ). Note that L a sim ∈ NP. Note that R a sim can be tested in time poly(a(n)) = poly(n).
Hard distributions over L a sim . We say that Z = {Z n } is a hard distribution over the statements of L a sim if there exists a negligible function negl such that for every non-uniform PPT algorithm A * and every sufficiently large n it holds that
The following lemma states that the transcripts of GenStat form a hard distribution over L sim . That is, it is hard for any PPT machine P * 1 to compute a witness ω to statements λ when λ is the transcript of GenStat between P * 1 and an honest V 1 . The proof follows [Bar01] .
Lemma 4.1 (Hardness of GenStat). Assume that {H n } is a family of collision-resistant hash functions against (non-uniform) PPT algorithms. There exists a negligible function negl such that for every (nonuniform) PPT Turing machine P * 1 , the probability that P * 1 , after interacting with an honest V 1 in protocol GenStat, writes a string ω on its (private) output tape such that R sim (λ, ω) = 1 is at most negl(n), where λ is the transcript of interaction between P * 1 and V 1 , and the probability is taken over the randomness of both P * 1 and V 1 .
Remark. We note that, by definition of R sim , expression R sim (λ, ω) = 1 is only defined for those tuples (λ, ω) for which R sim is decidable (not necessarily in polynomial time). Therefore, the statement of the lemma, in particular, means that the prover must write a string ω for which it is possible to test (not necessarily in polynomial times) that R sim (λ, ω) = 1. We can restate the lemma in terms of relations R a sim for every polynomial a, but as we shall see in the proof, a does not actually play a role. Therefore, we have chosen to avoid the use of a and directly state the lemma in terms of R sim .
Proof of lemma 4.1. Assume, on the contrary, that there exist polynomials p, q and a prover P * 1 such that P * 1 takes at most p(n) steps and writes a string ω on its private output tape such that for infinitely many values of n, δ(n) ≥ 1/q(n) where δ(n) is the probability that R sim (λ, ω) = 1 (where λ is sampled as defined in the lemma). Now consider the machine P * 1 in an execution of GenStat and let (h, c) be the first two messages in this interaction. Let the machine P * 1,h,c denote the machine P * 1 whose state has been frozen up to the point where c is sent in this execution. By a standard averaging argument, it follows that with probability at least δ/2 over the sampling of (h, c) in this interaction, the probability that P * 1,h,c writes a valid witness ω at the end of the interaction is at least δ/2. We call such (h, c) "good."
The following procedure finds collisions in h provided (h, c) are good: the procedure chooses two random strings r 1 , r 2 each of length n, feeds P * 1 with r 1 and then with r 2 separately; let
i , T i ) be the contents of the private output tape of P * 1,h,c when fed with string r i for i ∈ {1, 2}. The procedure outputs (Π 1 , Π 2 ) as the potential collision on h.
We claim that the procedure finds collisions in h with noticeable probability as follows. Note that since (h, c) is good, with probability δ 2 /4, it holds that R sim (λ i
Now, define I to be an inversion oracle which on input a query of the form (f, s) for f ∈ F n and s ∈ Range(f ) outputs s = f −1 ( s). Then, by definition of R sim (in particular, due to condition 4 in figure  2 ), we have that the output of Π T i i is the same as that of Π I i . I.e., Π I i outputs r i . Since Π I i is a deterministic computation, it holds that Π 1 and Π 2 are different programs whenever r 1 = r 2 (which happens with prob. 1 − 2 −n ). Further, since P * 1 runs in time at most p(n), programs Π 1 , Π 2 are of size at most p(n). Therefore, Π 1 and Π 2 are collisions in h, found with probability at least
It follows that collisions can be found for a noticeable (specifically, at least δ/2) fraction of functions in {H n } with noticeable probability (specifically, δ 2 /8). This concludes the proof.
A Nice Sampler for TM
Protocol GenStat allows us to build a (non uniform) sampling algorithm Samp which will be nice according to definition 3.2. In addition, the distribution of first output of Samp will give us a hard distribution over the statement of L a sim for every polynomial a. Samp uses the following simple TM: 9
SimLock(λ, ω, s):
Test if R sim (λ, ω) = 1, and if so output s; Else, output the empty string 0 n .
Also, for a fixed (λ, s), define SimLock λ,s (·) := SimLock(λ, ·, s). Machine SimLock λ,s essentially tests whether the input is a valid witness to λ, and if so outputs the fixed value s, and nothing otherwise. Note that it is possible that SimLock does not halt on some inputs. Also, w.l.o.g., we assume that Steps(SimLock λ,s 1 , ω) = Steps(SimLock λ,s 2 , ω) for every λ, ω and (s 1 , s 2 ){0, 1} n × {0, 1} n .
The sampler. The sampling algorithm, Samp s,P * 1 is defined with respect to a string s ∈ {0, 1} n and an arbitrary PPT interactive TM P * 1 . ITM P * 1 follows the instructions of GenStat protocol and interacts with algorithm V 1 . The distribution of first output of Samp s,P * 1 is independent of s, and captured by separately defining distribution Z P * 1 := {Z n,P * 1 } Samp s,P * 1 (1 n ).
•
• Output a randomly sampled transcript λ of GenStat, obtained by honestly interacting with P * 1 .
Note that the first output of Samp s,P *
1
(1 n ) and Z n,P * 1 are distributed identically for every (n, s). The following lemma is essentially a corollary of lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. For every non-uniform PPT TM P * 1 , and every s ∈ {0, 1} n , Samp s,P * 1 is a nice sampler for Turing machines (according to definition 3.2). Further, for every polynomial a :
Proof. Observe that the pair (SimLock λ,s , SimLock λ,0 n ) is always a pair of compatible TMs, by definition of SimLock. Now suppose that the second property of definition 3.2 is not satisfied. Then there exists an A, running in time at most a(n) for some polynomial a, which outputs an x with noticeable probability such that SimLock λ,s (x) = SimLock λ,0 n (x), and Steps(SimLock λ,s , x) ≤ a(n); here the probability is taken over the sampling of λ (which in turn is distributed according to Z n,P * 1 ). It follows, from the definition of SimLock λ,s , that x must be a witness to λ and therefore A is a PPT machine which finds witnesses to statements λ ∈ L a sim with noticeable probability. We can use A to violate lemma 4.1 as follows. Consider the machine B * 1,s which incorporates P * 1 and A. It then samples λ by routing messages between P * 1 and an external (honest) V 1 , and returns the output of A λ, SimLock λ,s , SimLock λ,0 n . It is straightforward to see that B * 1,s violates lemma 4.1 (for every fixed s). Further, λ is distributed according Z n,P * 1 and a is an arbitrary polynomial, this also proves the second part of the lemma.
A Simpler Variant of Our Protocol
In this section, we describe the simpler version of our protocol, namely Simple-cZK; it is a (fully) concurrent zero-knowledge protocol in constant (but not four) rounds. Let P denote the prover algorithm and V denote the verifier algorithm. Informally, the protocol has three stages:
1. In stage 1, P and V sample a statement λ = (h, c, r) for the relation R sim using the protocol GenStat.
2. In stage 2, V sends the image s of a randomly chosen input s under an injective OWF f and also sends f . Additionally, (a) V also sends an obfuscation of the machine SimLock λ,s which outputs s on every input ω for which R sim (λ, ω) = 1.
(b) V proves, using a ZK proof, that it computed all values in this stage honestly.
3. In stage 3, P proves that either it knows a witness w to x or it knows the pre-image f −1 ( s).
The formal description of protocol Simple-cZK appears in figure 3 . The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and injective one-way functions. Further, for every polynomial a : N → N, and every hard distribution Z over the statements of L a sim , assume the existence of Z-auxiliary differing-input obfuscation (diO) for the class of all polynomial-size Turing machines that halt in a polynomial number of steps. 10 Then, there exists a constant round, fully concurrent zero-knowledge protocol with negligible soundness, for all languages in NP.
We prove the above theorem by proving that protocol Simple-cZK is a fully concurrent zero-knowledge protocol with negligible soundness error (Theorem 5.6). It is clear that the protocol has constant rounds and perfect completeness. The soundness and concurrent-ZK properties of this protocol are proven in next two sections.
Inputs. The common input to P and V is a statement x ∈ L where language L ∈ NP. The prover's auxiliary input is a witness w such that R(x, w) = 1. The security parameter n is an implicit input to both parties.
Protocol. The protocol proceeds in three stages.
Stage 1: P and V execute the GenStat protocol in which V sends the first message h ← H n , P sends the second message c = Com(0 n ; u) for a random u, and V sends the final message r ← {0, 1} n . Let λ = h, c, r be the transcript.
Stage 2: V samples an injective one-way functions f ← F n , a random input s ∈ {0, 1} n , and a sufficiently long random tape ζ ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) and computes:
V sends (f, s, M λ,s ), and proves using a constant round ZK protocol (say Π ZK ) that there exist (s, ζ) satisfying equation (5.1) above.
Stage 3: P proves to V , using a 3-round WIPOK (say Π WIPOK ) the knowledge of either:
• w such that R(x, w) = 1; OR
• s such that f (s) = s.
Verifier's output: V accepts if the proof in stage 3 succeeds; otherwise, it rejects. 
Soundness
Lemma 5.2. Simple-cZK has negligible soundness error. 10 We note that we actually do not need obfuscation for the class of all PPT Turing machines. Instead, we only need obfuscation for those Turing machines of the form SimLock a where a is a polynomial and SimLock a is the same as SimLock except that it runs for at most a(|x|) steps on input x.
Proof. Let P * be a non-uniform cheating prover who succeeds in proving a false statement x / ∈ L with some non-negligible probability. There are two parts of the proof:
• first part shows that P * cannot compute the secret s with noticeable probability,
• second part shows that if x / ∈ L and P * convinces V with noticeable probability, then it can be used to compute s with noticeable probability-violating the first part.
We start with the first part of the proof. Let P * x,z,ρ denote the prover algorithm P * with non-uniform advice z and random tape fixed to ρ. Further define the following two machines:
This machine is identical to P * x,z,ρ except that it only executes stage 1 of the protocol, i.e., the GenStat part, aborts the rest of the execution and halts. The transcripts of this machine's interactions are of the form λ = (h, c, r).
Machine P * 2,(x,z,ρ) : This machine is identical to P * x,z,ρ except that it only executes first two stages of the protocol, namely stage 1 and stage 2, aborts the rest of the execution and halts. The transcripts of this machine's interaction contain λ = h, c, r , (f, s, M λ,s ) ), and the transcript of the ZK protocol.
Observe that the sampler Samp s,P * 1,(x,z,ρ)
, defined in section 4.3, is a well defined machine for every s with respect to our first algorithm P * 1,(x,z,ρ) . Further, it is a nice sampler due to lemma 4.2. We now prove that P * 2,(x,z,ρ) cannot learn the inverse of s. That is, Claim 5.3. The probability that P * 2,(x,z,ρ) , after an interacting with the honest verifier V in protocol Simple-cZK, writes a string s ∈ {0, 1} n on its private output tape such that
is at most negl(n) where (λ, (f, s, M λ,s ) ) is the (partial) transcript of the interaction and the probability is taken over the randomness of V .
Proof. Assume on the contrary that P * 2,(x,z,ρ) does write a string s satisfying the lemma with non-negligible probability δ = δ(n). We show how to use this machine to invert the injective function f in polynomial time. We start by consider the following machine B * 2,(x,z,ρ) which takes no input. Machine B * 2,(x,z,ρ) : 1. The machine incorporates P * 2,(x,z,ρ) and interacts with it by playing the role of V honestly until the end of stage 1. Let λ be the transcript of this stage.
2. At the start of stage 2, B * 2,(x,z,ρ) generates (f, s, M λ,s ) honestly. 3. B * 2,(x,z,ρ) employs the simulator of the ZK protocol and samples a a view for B * 2,(x,z,ρ) . 4. At the end of simulation, B * 2,(x,z,ρ) outputs the contents of P * 2,(x,z,ρ) 's private output tape. By construction, the view of P * 2,(x,z,ρ) is simulated perfectly by B * 2,(x,z,ρ) until the the ZK protocol begins. Therefore, from the properties of the ZK-simulator, it holds that the view of P * 2,(x,z,ρ) at the end of the simulation is computationally indistinguishable from its view in a real execution with V . It follows that the outputs of B * 2,(x,z,ρ) is a string s such that f (s) = s with probability δ ≥ δ − negl(n).
To build the inverter for f , the next step is to slightly modify B * 2,(x,z,ρ) : instead of computing the obfuscated TM M λ,s honestly, the new machine B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) sends the machine which instead outputs 0 n . I.e., Machine B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) : This machine is identical to B * 2,(x,z,ρ) except at the start of stage 1 it sends (f, s, M λ,0 n ) where:
always outputs 0 n on all inputs and λ is the transcript of stage 1.
We claim that B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) outputs s such that f (s) = s with probability δ ≥ δ − negl(n). To prove this, we construct a hybrid machine H * 2 . Machine H * 2 violates the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator O with respect to the nice sampler Samp s,P * 1,(x,z,ρ) for every s ∈ {0, 1} n .
Machine H * 2 : The machine proceeds as follows:
1. It samples a random f ∈ F n , s ∈ {0, 1} n . Sends s to the challenger, who feeds H * 2 with a challenge (λ, M b ) where b is a random bit and:
Note that the state of P * at the end of stage-1 can be completely defined by specifying the transcript of stage-1 (and in particular, (h, r)). Let st 1 denote the state of the prover when the transcript is fixed to λ (sampled above).
2. Run the prover P * from the state st 1 and complete stage 2 as follows: send the tuple (f, s = f (s), M b ) at the start of the stage 2, and proceed exactly as B * 2,(x,z,ρ) . I.e., use the simulator of the ZK protocol to complete stage 2 and output the contents of P * 2,(x,z,ρ) 's private output tape. Now observe that since the randomness ρ has been fixed, the state st 1 sampled by Samp s,P *
1,(x,z,ρ)
is distributed identically to the state of P * x,z,ρ at the end of stage 1. Further, when b = 0, the rest of the execution (and output) of H * 2 is distributed identically to that of B * 2,(x,z,ρ) , and when b = 1 it is identical to that of B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) . Due to lemma 4.2, Samp s,P * 1,(x,z,ρ) is a nice sampler. H * 2 therefore violates the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator O unless |δ − δ | ≤ negl(n).
Therefore, the machine B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) outputs s with probability δ . However, note that B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) does not need to know the value of s, and executes perfectly even if (f, s) are given by an outside challenger. Therefore, B * * 2,(x,z,ρ) is actually an inverter for f ∈ F n , succeeding with the final probability δ − negl(n). It follows that δ must be negligible in n, establishing the claim.
We now come to the second part of the proof. Suppose that x / ∈ L and the success probability of P * x,z,ρ is not negligible. This means that there exists a polynomial q such that for infinitely many values of n, P * x,z,ρ succeeds with probability δ 2 (n) ≥ 1/q(n). We show how to build a prover P * 2,(x,z,ρ) which violates claim 5.3.
Let Ext WIPOK be the knowledge extractor corresponding to the 3-round WIPOK. For concreteness, assume that Ext WIPOK is a black-box extractor which uses cheating prover P * WIPOK as an oracle. Let p := p(n) be the polynomial associated with the running time of the extractor Ext WIPOK ; i.e., Ext WIPOK extracts the witness in expected time p(n) Pr[P *
WIPOK succeeds] . The machine P * * 2,(x,z,ρ) incorporates the original prover P * 2 and proceeds as follows.
Cheating prover P * * 2,(x,z,ρ) : 1. Initiate an execution of Simple-cZK with an external V , routing its messages to the internal prover P steps, output whatever it outputs. Otherwise, output a random string of length n and halt.
Clearly, the running time of P * * 2,(x,z,ρ) is at most poly(n) + 4p/δ 2 = poly(n) + 4pq, which is polynomial. Further, by a standard averaging argument, it holds that if we fix the prover's state to st 2 , then with probability at least δ 2 /2 over the sampling of st 2 , the success probability of the residual prove P * st 2 is at least δ 2 /2 in the remainder execution (i.e., the WIPOK). Call such states st 2 "good".
For every good st 2 , the expected running time of the Ext WIPOK is 2p/δ 2 and it outputs a valid witnessspecifically the secret s (since is x is false)-with probability 1−negl(n). Therefore, by Markov's inequality, if st 2 is good, stopping Ext WIPOK after 4p/δ 2 steps (twice the expectation), still produces s with probability at least (1 − negl(n))/2. Since st 2 is good with probability at least δ 2 /2, we have that our extractor outputs s with probability at least δ 2 /2 × 1/2 − negl(n) ≥ δ 2 /8. This contradicts claim 5.3 unless δ 2 is negligible. This completes the proof of soundness.
Proof of knowledge property of Simple-cZK. We wish to note that the current construction may not satisfy the proof (argument) of knowledge property since for many states st 2 Ext WIPOK might take too long. Nevertheless, by a simple and standard modification, it is possible to build a witness extended emulator [Lin01, BL04] for our protocol. This is usually sufficient for most applications of POK. Alternatively, we can use a WIPOK with strict polynomial time extraction, in which case protocol Simple-cZK also becomes a POK.
The Simulator
The simulator is described in two parts. First we describe an "internal simulator" S · , which requires access to an oracle I that inverts injective one-way functions. This internal simulator is invoked by a "main" simulator S main , which is described later.
Before jumping into the full description of our simulators, we make a few remarks to aid our description:
1. The internal simulator is essentially a "light weight twin" of the main simulator. Meaning that it is identical to the main simulator in all respects except that it does not run the "heavy" computation for computing the simulation trapdoor (i.e., the secret s). The internal simulator simply makes queries to the inversion oracle, denoted I.
2. The main simulator therefore commits to its "light weight twin" as the program which will deterministically predict the string r in every session opened by V * .
3. Although this works, implementing this idea leads to small circularity. To correctly predict r, it is essential that the twin simulator use the same random tape. In particular, this means that the randomness to commit to the program (that predicts r) should come from the program to be committed. I.e., the randomness for the commitment is correlated to the message (i.e., the program) to be committed. This is also true for all subsequent messages which require randomness.
4. The above circularity can be avoided as follows. We allow the internal "twin" simulator to only have a commitment to each bit of the random tape. The twin can access the bit by making a query to the inversion oracle I. Since I only inverts (injective) one-way functions, we implement "commitment to the random tape" as hardcore bits of injective functions. The "committed" tape will be denoted by ρ = ( ρ 1 , . . . , ρ poly(n) ) and the i-th bit of the tape will be defined as:
where g is a global function fixed at the beginning by the main simulator. It will be convenient to define a procedure RandomBit which computes the bit ρ i as defined here.
5. We note that only the randomness that is used to "interact" with V * needs to be the same for both simulators. The main simulator can have additional randomness, which is not available to its twin, for other tasks.
We now describe the twin simulator S to be used internally by the main simulator. Without loss of generality, we assume that the string 1 n is never chosen as a session identifier for any session; it will be used as a special trigger during execution of the simulator. We will use the words "internal simulator" and "twin simulator" interchangeably to mean the simulator S · described below. For concreteness, we recall the inversion oracle I here and fix a procedure RandomBit I g, ρ as follows:
Inversion oracle I. The inversion oracle I(·) takes queries of the form (f, s) where f ∈ F n is a injective function from the family of (certified) injective functions {F n }, and s is an element in the range of f . The oracle returns the (unique) value s = f −1 ( s) if one exists; otherwise it returns a special symbol ⊥.
Procedure RandomBit I g, ρ (k). The procedure is defined for an injective function g ∈ F n and a string ρ = ( ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . .) of arbitrary length such that every component ρ k is in the range of g. On input an integer k, the procedure returns: · , B, z, g, ρ) . Algorithm S is an oracle TM. The input to the algorithm consists of a "session identifier" i ∈ {0, 1} n , a string A interpreted as an (interactive) oracle TM, a string B interpreted as an interactive TM, a string z ∈ {0, 1} * interpreted as an advice string, a string g describing an injective one-way function, and a sufficiently long string ρ = ( ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . .) ∈ {0, 1} * such that every component ρ i ∈ Range(g).
Simulator S has access to an inversion oracle I(·) as defined above. Inputs (g, ρ) fix the implicit random tape of S which is the unique bit-string ρ = (ρ 1 , ρ 2 . . .) where bit ρ k = RandomBit I g, ρ (k). 11 If, during its execution, S needs to access ρ k it calls RandomBit g, ρ (k).
The simulator S I computes its output as described below. It writes z on the auxiliary input tape of B, and a sufficiently long random string (taken from ρ) on the random tape of B. It then initiates an execution of B. If TM B launches a concurrent attack w.r.t. the protocol Simple-cZK, S proceeds as described below. Otherwise, if B deviates from the concurrent attack, S aborts the execution, outputting a special symbol ⊥.
1. If B opens a new session j, let x j be the statement to be proven and let h j be the first message of stage-1 of this session. S responds by sending the second message c j , which is computed as follows.
(a) Define the program Π · A,B,j to be the following oracle-TM:
I.e., program Π · A,B,j is an oracle-TM which takes no input and it is essentially the program A · whose first input has been fixed to j (a session identifier), second input has been fixed to the description of A · , third input has been fixed to the description of machine B, and last three inputs are fixed to z, g, and ρ. 
where u j is a uniform string taken from the implicit randome tape ρ.
2. If B sends a string r j , denoting the third message of stage 1 of session j, do the following: if j = i, output the string r i and halt. Otherwise, enter stage 2 of session j.
3. If B initiates stage-2 of an existing session j = i by sending:
as first message of stage-2 of this session. The simulator responds to each message of this stage honestly by playing the role of the honest verifier of ZK protocol. If B sends the final message of this stage and succeeds in the proof, it marks the start of stage-3.
4. If B initiates stage-3 of an existing session j = i, S sends the query (f j , s j ) to the oracle I, and learns the answer s j . I.e.,
If s j = ⊥, S outputs a special symbol sim fail and halts. Otherwise, it uses s j as the witness and completes the WIPOK honestly.
5. If B halts without sending the third message of stage-1 of session i, denoted r i , output the view of B and halt. 12 This completes the description of the twin simulator S · .
We now describe the main simulator S main . This simulator essentially runs the twin simulator S by setting its input A = S (i.e., the code of the twin simulator itself) and B = V * (i.e., the concurrent adversarial verifier). In addition, S main also simulates the inversion oracle I for S by keeping a track of the queries and recovering s i for every session i using the obfuscated TM M λ i ,s i .
Intuitively, setting B = V * and A = S, results in an execution where the twin simulator commits to its own code. Further, since S main only initiates an execution S on these inputs, the "simulated transcript" for both S main and S become identical. As a result, this ensures that S main does have a "fake witness," namely the program Π S,V * ,i (along with a partial table T j containing inverses for various one-way functions), to successfully run M λ i ,s i and get s i .
We need to fix a global polynomial bound, denoted Q V * (n), defined w.r.t. a given PPT adversary V * . This bound will be used in terminating certain computations in the main simulator, if they run for too long. Roughly speaking, it is the total time that the obfuscated code will take in outputting the secret s when it is fed with a valid witness ω (for some statement λ).
The polynomial is defined as follows. Let T V * (n) be the fixed polynomial bounding the running time of V * . Let a dio be the slowdown polynomial of the obfuscator O. 13 Let T Π,V * be a polynomial bounding the running time of the program Π I S,V * ,1 n := S I 1 n , desc(S · ), desc(V * ), z, g, ρ (for all strings z, g, ρ which are always bounded by T V * ).
Finally, recall that the program SimLock λ,s (ω) takes as input a witness ω = (u, Π · , T ) and halts in time that is polynomial in the running time of Π T and the size of T . Let a lock denote this polynomial, i.e.,
The description of our main simulator follows.
The main simulator S main desc(V * ), z ; ξ . The input to the main simulator is the description of the TM implementing the cheating verifier V * , the auxiliary input string z, and a sufficiently large random tape ξ. S main computes its output as follows:
1. Sample a (certified) injective OWF g ∈ F n , a sufficiently large bit-string ρ = (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . .), a collection of strings ( ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . .) such that for every valid k:
and we write ρ k = g( ρ k ). The size of ρ is at most (a known polynomial) T V * . Finally, initialize a global table T containing the inverses of all coordinates of ρ:
Perform all steps of the program Π · S,V * ,1 n answering its oracle queries using the table T , which is updated dynamically as described below. If a query cannot be answered using T , output sim fail. Let us recall that,
Note that since 1 n is never selected as a session identifier, the output of this simulation is always either a view of V * , special symbol sim fail, or abort symbol ⊥.
3. Table T is updated dynamically as the execution of Π · S,V * ,1 n proceeds. To describe how T is updated, define the following three quantities associated with a session whose identifier is i ∈ {0, 1} n \ {1 n }: Table T i which is equal to the contents of T at the time when r i is sent by V * (c) "Fake" witness
Note that the value of ω i also gets completely defined when r i is received. Further, S main has access to ω i for every session i in the simulation.
4. When V * completes stage-2 of some session i, it has successfully proven the validity of the statement defined by the tuple f i , s i , M λ i ,s i . Compute
by running the obfuscated program M λ i ,s i for at most Q V * (n) steps (see (5.2). If a valid s i is received, append (f i , s i , s i ) to T ; otherwise, output sim fail and halt. 14 5. When Π · S,V * ,1 n sends a query (f i , s i ), S main locates the corresponding entry in T . If a matching entry (f i , s i , s i ) is found, it returns s i . If a matching entry is not found, S main aborts the entire execution, outputs a special symbol sim fail, and halts.
When the program Π · S,V * ,1 n halts, S main outputs whatever Π · S,V * ,1 n outputs and halts.
Indistinguishability of Simulation
We argue that the output of S main , on input the description of a cheating verifier V * , is computationally indistinguishable from the output of V * in a random execution of the concurrent attack experiment. We prove this by designing a several hybrid experiments, starting from the "real" experiment in which all witnesses are actually given to the experiment.
At a high level, there are three main steps in the proof:
1. The first step is to commit to the description of the twin simulator using fresh randomness u i (that is not correlated to ρ) for every session i.
2. The second step is to argue that even if S main uses randomness derived from RandomBit g, ρ (which is correlated to ρ), the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable.
3. The third step is to use the secret s i instead of the witness w i in the WIPOK part. However, this needs to be done one-by-one for each session in the order in which r i is received. The order is important to ensure that all sessions whose stage-3 gets scheduled before a particular r i , are actually using the "fake witness" (and not the real witnesses). This will ensure that the fake witness for session i is also available to the simulator.
We now describe our hybrids.
Hybrid H 1 . This experiment is identical to the concurrent attack experiment. The experiment incorporates the verifier program V * and auxiliary input z. It initiates a concurrent execution with V * . For every session i, H 1 is provided with a witness w i to the statement x i being proven. H 1 uses honest prover algorithms and fresh randomness for all tasks. When V * halts, H 1 outputs the view of V * , denoted ν 1 .
Hybrid H 2 . This hybrid is identical to H 1 except that at the start of the experiment, H 2 samples the function g, string ρ, and table T exactly as in step 1 of S main . Let ν 2 denote the output of H 2 .
Hybrid H 3 . This experiment is identical to H 2 except that in every session i, commitment c i (i.e., the second message of stage 1) is computed as follows:
where h i is the first message of session i, program Π · S,V * ,i is defined in (5.3), 15 and u i is uniformly chosen. Let ν 3 denote the output of H 3 .
Hybrid H 4 . This experiment is identical to H 3 except that after sampling g, ρ, and T , the experiment does not sample any more random bits. Instead, H 4 keeps a counter k initialized to 0 and whenever a new random bit is needed, it does the following: increments k by 1, sets ρ k ← RandomBit Proof. By construction, every H i uses the real witnesses {w j } to succeed in WIPOK part of the protocol, and all other steps are polynomial time computations. Further, every H i only access T via RandomBit procedure. By construction T contains answers to all queries of RandomBit, never leading to sim fail.
The difference between H 1 and H 2 does not change the output, and hence ν 1 ≡ ν 2 . By computational hiding of Com, ν 2 c ≈ ν 3 since the only difference between H 2 and H 3 is that they commit different, but known, strings to V * . By applying the same argument to H 3 and H 4 , and using the pseudo-randomness property of hard-core bits, we conclude that ν 3 c ≈ ν 4 .
For every partial transcript ν of the concurrent execution, we can define an ordering of the sessions that appear in ν. We order the session identifiers i according to the order in which strings r i -which is the second message of stage-1 of session i-are received. I.e., identifier i 1 is ordered before identifier i 2 if r i 1 is scheduled before r i 2 . Note that ordering depends on the scheduling and hence the actual transcript ν. The ordering is well defined for the sessions which have appeared in ν even if ν is not completely fixed yet and this order does not change as new sessions are added to ν in course of a concurrent attack.
Define id ν (i) to be a number which tells us the position of session i in (possibly partial) transcript ν acceding to the above ordering. Note that id −1 ν (m) is also well defined and identifies which session's r was received in m-th position. The transcript ν will often be clear from the context, and we will drop it from the notation and simply write id(i) and id −1 (m).
For m ∈ [T V * ], we define our next set of hybrids.
15 Note that g, ρ are already defined at this point and so this program is also well defined.
Hybrid G 0:2 . This hybrid is same as H 4 .
Hybrid G m:1 . This hybrid is same as G m−1:2 except for the following difference. Let i m = id −1 (m) be the session-id of a session such that r im is the m-th such string scheduled/sent by V * . Then, this experiment computes:
for at most Q V * (n) steps; (here all quantities are defined as before w.r.t. the session i m ). If s im = ⊥, G m:1 appends (f im , s im , s im ) to T ; otherwise it outputs a special symbol sim fail, and halts. Let ν m:1 denote the output of G m:1 .
Hybrid G m:2 . This hybrid is same as G m:1 except that when stage-3 of session i m begins, it probes T on query (f im , s im ) to obtain s im . If s im is found, it is used as the witness to complete the WIPOK proof. If s im is not found, G m:2 outputs sim fail. Let ν m:2 denote the output of this experiment.
It should be noted that the output of the final hybrid, namely G T V * :2 , is identical to that of S main . We now show that:
Lemma 5.5 (Main Lemma). For every m ∈ {1, . . . , T V * }, the following conditions hold:
• G m:1 and G m:2 are PPT experiments which output sim fail with only negligible probability, where the probability is taken over the sampling of tuple (g, ρ) used by the procedure RandomBit g, ρ .
• ν m−1:2
Proof. We start by observing that G 0:2 is the same as H 4 , it is a PPT experiment which outputs sim fail with negligible probability (by claim 5.4). Recall that program Π I S,V * ,i outputs sim fail if and only if there exists a session j in the execution such that (f j , s j ) is sent as a query but a unique f −1 ( s j ) does not exist. However, since we assumed 16 that it is possible to efficiently test that f j is injective and s j is in the range of f j , it follows that a unique inverse always exists, and hence Π I S,V * ,i never outputs sim fail. Let us compare the hybrids G m−1:2 and G m:1 . If we fix the random tape of these hybrids to be the same string ξ then, by construction, the execution of the two experiments are identical up to the point where r im is sent (where i m = id −1 (m) is the identifier of the session in m-th position in the order). Let T im be the contents of the table at this point. Further, let
; u im be the commitment sent as the second message of stage-1 of session i m . 17 If G m−1:2 does not output sim fail on randomness ξ, then the string:
As noted earlier, these assumption are only for simplicity and can be removed because of the following. The proof ΠZK given by the verifier already proves that sj is in the range of fj; we can further require it to also prove that fj was sampled using the key-generation algorithm of {Fn} which is known to be injective. By soundness of ZK, it will follow that Π I S,V * ,i outputs sim fail with negligible probability.
17 By construction, ci m , Ti m , and ri m are same in both experiments.
is a "fake witness" to the statement λ im = (h im , c im , r im ). This is because by our ordering relation, every message between r i m−1 and r im is either a stage-3 message of a session j such that id(j) < m or it is not a stage-3 message at all. Therefore, if V * sends a TM M λ im ,s im which is indeed an obfuscation of SimLock λ im,s im , G m:1 learns s im successfully (since the obfuscated TM takes less than Q V * (n) steps, by definition of Q V * ). By the soundness of ZK protocol (stage 2), M λ im ,s im is indeed a correct obfuscation with 1 − negl(n) probability, and hence outputs s im within Q V * (n) steps. As the only difference between G m−1:2 and G m:2 is in how they sample s im , it follows that: Theorem 5.6. Assume that {H n } is a family of collision-resistant hash function, {F n } a family of injective one-way functions, Com a non-interactive perfectly binding (string) commitment scheme, and protocols Π ZK and Π WIPOK are (constant-round) ZK and WIPOK systems respectively for NP. Further assume that for every polynomial a : N → N, and every hard distribution Z over the statements of L a sim , O is a Zauxiliary differing-input obfuscation (diO) for the class of all polynomial-size Turing machines that halt in a polynomial number of steps. Then, Simple-cZK is a constant-round, fully concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for all languages in NP, with perfect completeness and negligible soundness.
Proof. The perfect completeness and constant-round claim is straightforward to see. The negligible soundness was proven in lemma 5.2. Concurrent ZK follows by observing that the output of S main is indistinguishable from the view of V * in a concurrent attack due to claim 5.4 and lemma 5.5 and by observing that m is bounded by the (polynomial) running time V * .
The Four Round Protocol
In the previous section, we presented a reduction from constant round, concurrent zero-knowledge to diO based on standard cryptographic assumptions. In this section, we present a similar reduction for four message concurrent zero-knowledge.
Let us start by optimizing the number of rounds in our constant round protocol of previous section. The standalone ZK protocol used in stage 2 has at least four rounds. 18 Since the last message of this ZK protocol must come from the verifier, our resulting protocol will have at least five rounds even after optimizations.
We consider two approaches to obtain a four round protocol. First, we can use a two-round ZK protocol with super polynomial time simulation [Pas03] . This approach gives us a reduction where the soundness of the resulting protocol must assume sub-exponential hardness assumptions. The second approach is to use a WI protocol to prove the correctness of the obfuscated program. However, in typical applications of WI, to get any useful security we must somehow ensure that the statement being proven has at least two witnesses.
The standard approach in such cases is to consider two independently sampled statements, in this case, two obfuscated programs M λ,s and M λ,s ; and prove that at least one of them is correctly constructed using a WI proof. However, this approach actually fails for a very interesting reason. Although it does hide one of the secrets s, s , it actually breaks the simulation. Indeed, the internal simulator committed to in the preamble, will have no efficient way of knowing which of these two programs is actually correctly prepared. In particular, it will have to ask for the inversion of two challenges per session but the main simulator might be able to return only one of them (since one of the obfuscated programs could have been maliciously prepared). Attempting to overcome this subtle issue actually breaks the hardness of R sim .
We therefore use a different approach; we set up an "intermediate statement" which is selected by the prover, and require the prover to provide a WIPOK of its correctness. The verifier then proves that either this intermediate statement is true or the obfuscated program is correctly prepared. The intermediate statement is prepared in such a way that it is possible to make it false and succeed (using the real witness for x) without the verifier noticing. This allows us to ensure that the obfuscated program must be correctly prepared and simulation still continues to go through. For the soundness, roughly speaking, we can extract the witness corresponding to the "intermediate statement" by using the extractor of WIPOK; we then use it to simulate the WI proof that comes from verifier's side. This allows us to again enforce the ideas we developed to prove the soundness of the Simple-cZK protocol.
To setup the "intermediate statement" we use perfectly binding commitments to specially prepared strings. In the final proof, we will need to actually extract the secret s to violate the hardness of oneway functions. We get around this difficulty by using a combination of the WIPOK used by the prover and a ZAP proof. We now present an overview of our four round protocol below. The formal description of the protocol appears in Section 6.1. A pictorial representation of the protocol appears in figure 4.
Four round protocol for concurrent zero-knowledge. The protocol has four components whose messages will be sent in parallel (as depicted in figure 4 ).
1. The first component is the GenStat protocol, producing statements of the form λ = h, c, r .
2. The second component is a three round WIPOK given by the prover to the verfier. The prover prepares two commitments, namely t 1 = Com(0 t 1 ; v 1 ) and t 2 = Com(0 t 2 ; v 2 ) and proves that either ( t 1 , t 2 ) are correctly prepared or x is true. The 3 messages of this WIPOK will be denoted by α, β, γ .
3. The final component is a ZAP for a specially prepared statement, which will let us extract either a witness to x or the secret s in the proof of soundness. The special statement is prepared as follows.
The prover creates two commitments τ 1 , τ 2 such that τ 1 uses string t 1 (defined above in item 2) as its randomness; likewise τ 2 uses t 2 . Further, the value committed to in one of them is the witness w for statement x. The prover then proves, using a ZAP, that there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that τ i is a commitment to w using t i . The two messages of this ZAP are denoted by σ , π .
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which is proven by showing that protocol cZK is fully concurrent zero-knowledge (Theorem 6.3) shortly.
Theorem 6.1. Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and trapdoor one-way permutations (alternatively, injective one-way functions and ZAP proofs for NP). Further, for every polynomial a : N → N, and every hard distribution Z over the statements of L a sim , assume the existence of Z-auxiliary differing-input obfuscation (diO) for the class of all polynomial-size Turing machines that halt in a polynomial number of steps. Then, there exists a four message, fully concurrent zero-knowledge protocol with negligible soundness, for all languages in NP. 
Protocol cZK
Inputs. The common input is a statement x ∈ L where language L ∈ NP. The prover's auxiliary input is a witness w such that R(x, w) = 1. Let us assume that L is the NP-complete language of graph Hamiltonicity. 19 The security parameter n is an implicit input to both the prover as well as the verifier. Without loss of generality, we assume that |w| = n. Let {H n } be a family of CRHF, {F n } be a family of injective oneway functions with efficiently testable range membership, and Com be a non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme for committing strings of arbitrary polynomial length. For concreteness, let Π WIPOK be a 3-round public-coin WI protocol with special properties (described in Section 2) and Π ZAP be a ZAP proof system.
Rounds. The prover P and the verifier V interact as follows.
1. The verifier sends a CRHF function h ← H n .
2. The prover sends c, t 1 , t 2 , α, σ where: 19 The statements x ∈ L are graphs which contain a Hamiltonian cycle, and the witness w is a Hamiltonian cycle in x.
(a) c = Com(0 n ; u) for a randomly chosen u; (b) t 1 , t 2 are commitments created as follows: t i = Com(0 t i ; v i ) for every i ∈ {1, 2} and t i , v i are random strings (of sufficient length);
(c) α is the first prover message of Π WIPOK for the statement:
(d) σ is the first message of the ZAP proof;
The prover uses witness of the second part, namely (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 ), for computing α and all subsequent messages corresponding to the prover of Π WIPOK .
The verifier sends
r, f, s, M λ,s , β, π, σ where:
(a) r ← {0, 1} n is a random string, and λ := (h, c, r) is already defined by the transcript; (b) f ∈ F n is a (randomly chosen) injective one-way function, s = f (s) for a random string s ∈ {0, 1} n , and M λ,s is the obfuscation of SimLock λ,s , generated using randomness (say) ζ. 20 I.e.,
(c) β is the second message of Π WIPOK (a random string);
(d) π is the second message of ZAP proof (w.r.t. first message σ) proving the statement:
The verifier uses (s, ζ) as the witness to compute π.
(e) σ is a freshly sampled first message of the ZAP proof.
4. The prover checks that (σ, π) is a valid proof. If so, it sends
where:
(a) γ is the last message of Π WIPOK (computed using the witness (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 )-see step 2).
(b) One of the strings τ 1 , τ 2 is a commitment to the real witness w using one of t 1 , t 2 as randomness. That is, P chooses a random i ∈ {1, 2} and sets: τ i = Com(w; t i ). The other string is a commitment to 0 n . That is, τ i = Com(0 n ; t i ) where i = {1, 2} \ i.
(c) π is the the second message of the ZAP proof, proving that there exists an i such that either "τ i commits to w OR it commits to the secret s using randomness t i ." Formally, π proves that:
and it holds that either R(x, a) = 1 OR f (a) = s. The prover computes π using the knowledge of (i, w, t i , v i ).
5.
Verifier's output. The verifier accepts if and only if both (α, β, γ) and (σ , π ) are accepted by the corresponding verifier algorithms. Otherwise it rejects.
This completes the description of our protocol.
We now prove that cZK is a concurrent zero-knowledge protocol with negligible soundness error.
Proof of Soundness
The proof of soundness is very similar to the soundness of Simple-cZK. We therefore only present a proof sketch.
Lemma 6.2. Prototocol cZK has negligible soundness error.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to extract the values t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 from a cheating prover P * , and use them in the ZAP proof given by the verifier. Thereafter, extract the value of s from τ 1 , τ 2 using t 1 , t 2 and invert the one-way function family. The details follow. Suppose that there exists a polynomial q and a cheating prover P * such that for infinitely many values of the security parameter n, P * successfully proves a false x / ∈ L probability δ = 1/q(n). Further, let p := p(n) be the polynomial associated with the running time of the extractor Ext WIPOK ; i.e., Ext WIPOK extracts the witness in expected time
Consider the following prover machine M * 1 which behaves like P * except that it also attempts to extract the value of the secret s.
Machine M * 1 : this machine incorporates the prover P * and interacts with an external V of our cZK protocol as follows:
1. Route the first two messages between P * and V . Let P * st denote the state of P * at this point and let t 1 , t 2 be the two commitments in the second message and α be the first message of the WIPOK protocol. Before proceeding further, do the following: (a) Consider the machine B * which acts as prover of the Π WIPOK protocol for the statement t 1 , t 2 . B * always sends α that has already been received. Upon receiving a challenge β, B * samples the third message of our cZK protocol honestly by following V 's algorithm except that it uses β received from the outside party as the challenge for the internal WIPOK protocol. If internal P * st responds with a convincing last message, B * forwards only the first component, namely γ to the outside verifier. This defines the machine B * completely. (b) Apply the extractor Ext WIPOK to the machine B * , running for at most 4p/δ steps. If a correct witness to ( t 1 , t 2 ) is not extracted, abort the entire execution; otherwise continue to the next step with the extracted value, say (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 ).
2. Receive the third message from the outside verifier of our cZK protocol, feed it to P * st , and forward the resulting response to V . In addition, if τ 1 , τ 2 are the commitment strings in the last message, attempt to extract the values a 1 , a 2 (using the randomness t 1 , t 2 ) in these commitments. If f (a i ) = s for some i ∈ {1, 2} (where (f, s) are received from V in the third round) write a i on its private output tape and halt.
Observe that the only difference between M * 1 and P * is that the former employs a witness extraction strategy and aborts if it fails after 4p/δ steps. Since there is at least δ/2 fraction of states st such that P * st succeeds with probability at least δ/2 in the remainder of the execution, we have that the extraction does succeed with probability at least 1/2 − negl(n) for such a P * st . Since x / ∈ L, this extraction results in s = f −1 ( s. Therefore, M * 1 writes s on its private output tape with at least
16 . Next, we consider the machine which uses the extracted values (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) as the witness in computing the verifier's ZAP (σ, π). Formally, consider the following machines:
Machine M * 2 : identical to M * 1 except that it internally simulates all the steps of our honest verifier V and does not communicate with an external V .
Machine M * 3 : identical to M * 2 except that it uses extracted values (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) in computing the ZAP proof π.
It is clear that the outputs of M * 1 and M * 2 are distributed identically; further due to the WI property, the output of M * 3 is computationally indistinguishable from that of M * 2 . It follows that M * 3 writes a string s on its private output tape such that f −1 (s) = s with probability at least δ 2 /16 − negl(n).
Finally, consider the following machine M * 4 : this machine is identical to M * 3 except that instead of sending the obfuscation of SimLock λ,s , it sends obfuscation of SimLock λ,0 n (in the internal simulation of honest V ). We claim that the outputs of M * 3 and M * 4 are computationally indistinguishable. This is demonstrated by the following hybrid machine:
Machine H * : this machine is identical to M * 3 except that it does not simulate the messages λ := (h, c, r) and M λ,s internally. Instead these messages are received from an external verifier V 1 which acts exactly like the GenStat verifier V 1 ; however, after the messages (h, c, r) are completed, H * internally generates (f, f (s)) and then sends s to V 1 . Verifier V 1 responds by sending either an honestly generated obfuscation of SimLock λ,s or that of SimLock λ,0 n , chosen randomly.
It is straightforward to see that machine H * satisfies the conditions of a nice sampler; in particular, it receives the obfuscation of one of the two machines produced by the nice sampler Samp s,H * . H * is identical to M * 3 (resp., M * 4 ) if V 1 sends an obfuscation of SimLock λ,s (resp., SimLock λ,0 n ). Therefore, from the indistinguishability property of O, the outputs of M * 3 and M * 4 are computationally indistinguishable. It follows that M * 4 also write the inverse s on its private output tape. However, note that the execution of M * 4 does not need to know the string s and runs perfectly even if only (f, s = f (s)) are provided to it by an external challenger. Therefore M * 4 is an inverter for the one-way function. Hence the lemma.
The Simulator and Proof of Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
As before, the simulator is described in two parts: an internal/twin simulator which requires access to the oracle I and a main simulator which invokes the internal simulator. The description of these simulators is really the same as for the Simple-cZK protocol except that the messages are computed according to the four-round cZK protocol. To distinguish the simulators from previous sections, the internal and the main simulators for the fourround protocol will be denoted by S . This simulator proceeds identically to the twin simulator S · defined in section 5.2 except that it only has to send two messages in every session: the second and the fourth messages. We only mention how these messages are prepared: every polynomial a : N → N, and every hard distribution Z over the statements of L a sim , O is a Zauxiliary differing-input obfuscation (diO) for the class of all polynomial-size Turing machines that halt in a polynomial number of steps. Then, cZK is a four message, fully concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for all languages in NP, with perfect completeness and negligible soundness.
Proof (sketch). The proof is obtained by following the proof of theorem 5.6. Namely, the same proof and the hybrid experiments are also valid for proving the computational indistinguishability of the output of the main simulator S (4) main described above. However, one additional argument is required to prove zeroknowledge-in particular to show that in hybrid G m:1 , the extracted value is indeed the secret s im (i.e., a correct inverse).
Let us highlight why this new argument is needed. In the earlier Simple-cZK protocol, the soundness of ZK protocol ensured that the extracted value is indeed the correct secret s im . However, since we are now using a ZAP proof in the four round protocol (cZK), we need to argue this claim separately. Below we argue (only) this claim, and the rest of the proof is the same as before.
Suppose that the claim is not true in the hybrid G m:1 . That is, with noticeable probability, the extracted value s im is not a correct inverse of the corresponding values (f im , s im ) that appears in the transcript of session i m . Recall that in hybrid G m:1 , all sessions i m for m ≥ m still use a valid witness in preparing the values (τ 1,i m , τ 2,i m ) and π i m . We consider the following two hybrid experiments:
1. Hybrid G m:1 : same as G m:1 except that in the WIPOK proof of session i m , instead of using values (t 1 , t 2 , v 1 , v 2 ), the prover uses the real witness w to compute messages (α, β, γ).
2. Hybrid G m:1 : same as G m:1 except that one of the two strings ( t 1 , t 2 ), say t i for a randomly chosen i ∈ {1, 2} is incorrectly prepared by appending 1 (instead of 0) in front of t i ; that is: t i = Com(1 t i ; u i ). We note that i is fixed at this step, and in the last step τ i contains w such that i = i . This is necessary since otherwise the hybrid cannot complete the proof successfully. 21 Now, observe that the output of G m:1 is computationally indistinguishable from that of G m:1 due to the WI property of Π WIPOK . Further, G m:2 is computationally indistinguishable from G m:1 due to the security of commitment scheme. This can be seen in three steps as follows. In the first step, the randomness used in the committing τ i (in game G m:1 is changed from t i to a random string; the output of the game even after this change remains computationally indistinguishable from its previous output because this change can be simulated perfectly by taking a commitment from outside challenger who either commits to 0 t i or 0 t * for a random string t * . In the second step, string t i is changed to a commitment to 1 t i instead of 0 t i and this keeps the output of the game computationally indistinguishable, since, as before this change can be perfectly simulated by receiving string t i from an outside challenger who either commits to 0 t i or 1 t i . In the final step, the randomness of τ i is changed back from uniform (i.e., t * ) to t i and indistinguishability is argued as in the first step. Hence, the outputs of G m:1 and G m:2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Therefore, it follows that if s im is not a correct inverse in G m:1 , then the same holds for it in hybrid G m:1 . However, the soundness of ZAP now implies that the statement represented by ( t 1 , t 2 ) is false and thus the obfuscation must have been correctly computed. Therefore, in G im , the value computed by S (4) main by running the obfuscated code must indeed yield a correct inverse s im . This is a contradiction. We conclude that the outputs of the obfuscated programs in game G m:1 must yield correct inverses as desired.
